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Abstract
The current practice of envy-free rent division, lead by the fair allocation website
Spliddit, is based on quasi-linear preferences. These preferences rule out agents’ well
documented financial constraints. To resolve this issue we consider piece-wise linear
budget constrained preferences. These preferences admit differences in agents’ marginal
disutility of paying rent below and above a given reference, i.e., a soft budget. We
construct a polynomial algorithm to calculate a maxmin utility envy-free allocation,
and other related solutions, in this domain.
JEL classification: C72, D63.
Keywords : market design, algorithmic game theory, equitable rent division, no-envy,
quasi-linear preferences, non-linear preferences.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview of the problem
The envy-free rent division problem is one of the success stories of computational fair
division. It addresses the allocation of rooms and payments of rent among roommates who
lease an apartment or a house. The objective is to find a recommendation in which each
roommate finds her assignment is at least as good as that of the other roommates.
Research on this problem first concentrated on quasi-linear environments. An early
result showed the existence of a polynomial algorithm to calculate an envy-free allocation
∗Thanks to Ariel Procaccia and seminar participants at the 2019 Economic Design and Algorithms in St.
Petersburg Workshop and UT Austin for useful comments. The results of this paper circulated previously
in a paper that is now solely dedicated to the incentives issues in rent allocation with soft budgets (Velez,
2019). All errors are my own.
†rvelezca@tamu.edu; https://sites.google.com/site/rodrigoavelezswebpage/home
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(Aragones, 1995).1 More recently, Gal et al. (2017) argued that there are compelling differ-
ences among envy-free allocations, presented evidence that these differences are perceived by
agents, identified the maxmin utility envy-free allocations as possible candidates to minimize
these issues, and constructed a polynomial algorithm to calculate one of these allocations.
Passing quickly from theory to practice, the fair allocation website Spliddit (Goldman
and Procaccia, 2014) implemented Gal et al. (2017)’s approach. Along the tens of thousands
of instances in which the algorithm has been put in practice, its users have also provided a
series of requests for its improvement. From this feedback, Procaccia et al. (2018) identified
the inability of the system to handle budget constraints as its main shortcoming.
Two partial answers have been proposed so far to this issue. First, Procaccia et al. (2018)
elicit agents’ values for rooms and hard budget constraints, and construct a polynomial
algorithm to determine whether an envy-free allocation satisfying the budget constraints
exists. Whenever possible their algorithm returns a maxmin utility allocation constrained
to the envy-free allocations that satisfy budget constraints. When no such allocation exists,
so it is necessary that at least one agent pays above her stated budget constraint, Procaccia
et al. (2018) algorithm has the limitation that it calculates an allocation that is envy-free
with respect to the underlying reported quasi-linear preference. This recommendation is
not informed by the agents’ preferences to go over their budget. The second approach,
advanced by Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018), addresses this issue. They propose to enlarge
the space of admissible preferences to include piece-wise linear preferences as follows: Each
agent has a reference rent (a soft budget) that determines a breaking point in the marginal
disutility of paying rent (see functional form in Sec. 2). We will refer to these as budget
constrained piece-wise linear preferences. These authors construct a polynomial algorithm
to calculate an envy-free allocation for a fixed finite set of possible values for the marginal
disutility of paying rent above the agents’ budget. The algorithm has the limitation that
it loses control of the location of the constructed allocation within the envy-free set. Since
some envy-free allocations are intuitively biased (Gal et al., 2017), this approach runs the
risk to make such a recommendation.
The objective of this paper is then is to study the computation of particular selections
of the envy-free set with budget constrained piece-wise linear preferences. Of particular
interest to us are the maxmin utility envy-free allocations.
1.2 Our contribution
We construct a family of polynomial algorithms, with the same fixed parameters of
Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018), that compute allocations selected by the maxmin and
minmax utility and maxmin and minmax money linear selections of the envy-free set (The-
orem 1). Sec. 2 presents precise definitions. For the moment, it is relevant to add that
1All algorithms we refer to and construct are polynomial in the number of agents.
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the following prominent selections of the envy-free set are particular cases covered by the
theorem.
• Maxmin utility envy-free allocation: maximizes the minimal utility across agents
within the envy-free set. This selection is advocated by Gal et al. (2017).
• Best envy-free allocation for a given agent: maximizes a given agent’s utility within
the envy-free set. This selection is minimally manipulable on several partial orders of
manipulability (Andersson et al., 2014).
• Maxmin rent envy-free allocation: maximizes the minimum rent paid by any agent.
Calculating such an allocation determines the existence of envy-free allocations in
which no agent is compensated to receive a room (the non-negativity restriction is
usually avoided in the literature).
• Minmax rent envy-free allocation: minimizes the maximal rent paid by any agent.
This selection implements the tightest uniform rent control that is compatible with
no-envy.
• An allocation that minimizes, among all envy-free allocations, the rent paid by the
agent who is assigned a given room.
• An allocation that maximizes, among all envy-free allocations, the rent paid by the
agent who is assigned a given room.
1.3 Significance for CS and Economics
Our work contributes in two independent levels. First, we address an issue that has been
identified from real-world requests in one of the most successful application of computational
social choice. As such, our proposals have the potential to be deployed in practice. Second,
at a technical level, we bridge two independent branches of the literature on envy-free rent
division. On the one hand, we work on the algorithmic framework developed by Gal et al.
(2017) and Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018). On the other hand, we manage to exploit from
a computational perspective the topological properties of the envy-free set that economists
have used in unrestricted continuous economies to understand the normative and structural
properties of these allocations (c.f., Alkan et al., 1991; Velez, 2017, 2018). Showing that
this can be done constitutes in itself a case study of the successful interaction between these
fields.
2 Model
A set of n rooms, A := {a, b, . . . }, is to be allocated among n agents N := {1, ..., n}. Each
agent is to receive a room and pay an amount of money for it. Agent i generic allotment
3
is (ra, a) ∈ R× A. When ra ≥ 0 we interpret this as the amount of money agent i pays to
receive room a. We allow for negative payments of rent, i.e., ra < 0.
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Each agent has preferences on bundles of rooms and payments of rent represented by a
utility function of the following form. There are (via)a∈A ∈ R
A, bi ≥ 0, and ρi ∈ R+ such
that
ui(ra, a) = v
i
a − ra − ρimax{0, ra − bi}.
For a finite set {ρ1, . . . , ρk} ⊆ R+ that we fix throughout, the space of preferences in which
the coefficient ρi belongs to this set is B. We assume without loss of generality that ρ1 = 0,
so B contains the space of quasi-linear preferences.
Our preference domain has an intuitive structure. The agent has an underlying quasi-
linear preference. However, the marginal disutility of paying rent is not uniform. The agent
has a soft budget bi, i.e., an amount of money she expects to spend on housing. Paying one
dollar above bi entails a larger disutility than that of paying one dollar more still under bi.
This reflects, for instance, that either the agent is budget constrained and needs to pay an
interest rate on money paid above her budget, or that she needs to reallocate money from
other needs like transportation or entertainment in order to pay rent over bi.
Individual payments should add up to m ∈ R, the house rent. An economy is described
by the tuple e := (N,A, u,m). An allocation for e is a pair (r, σ) where σ : N → A is a
bijection and r := (ra)a∈A is such that
∑
a∈A ra = m. An allocation is envy-free for e if
no agent prefers the consumption of any other agent at the allocation. The set of these
allocations is F (e).
3 Results
3.1 The main result
For constants a > 0 and b ∈ R, we refer to the function x ∈ R 7→ b + ax as a positive
affine linear transformation. We develop a family of polynomial algorithms to calculate an
allocation that maximizes (minimizes) the minimum (maximum) of positive affine linear
transformations of individual utility (or payments of rent) among all envy-free allocations
when preferences belong to B.
Theorem 1. Let e := (N,A, u,m) be such that u ∈ BN . For S ⊆ N and C ⊆ A, let (fi)i∈S
and (gc)a∈C be lists of positive affine linear transformations. Then, there are polynomial
algorithms with input size n that compute an element in:
2It is possible to restrict preferences to a cartesian domain that guarantees payments of rent are always
nonnegative at each envy-free allocation (Velez, 2011). Our results obviously apply to these subdomains.
Most importantly, by considering the unrestricted problem, we are able to construct a polynomial algorithm
that determines whether an envy-free allocation in which no agent is compensated exists for a particular
preference profile.
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1. argmax
(r,σ)∈F (e)
mini∈S fi(ui(rσ(i), σ(i)));
2. argmin
(r,σ)∈F (e)
maxi∈S fi(ui(rσ(i), σ(i)));
3. argmax
(r,µ)∈F (e)
mina∈C ga(ra);
4. argmin
(r,µ)∈F (e)
maxa∈C ga(ra).
We initially limit our presentation to our main application, i.e., the maxmin utility
solution
R(N,A, u,m) := argmax
(r,σ)∈F (N,A,u,m)
min
i∈N
ui(rσ(i), σ(i)).
We discuss the proof of the theorem in Sec. 3.5.
Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) introduced an algorithm that calculates an envy-free
allocation when preferences are represented by piece-wise linear functions, a domain con-
taining B.3 When preferences are in B, so the number of different values of the budget
violation index that an agent can report is k, their algorithm runs in O(nk+c) for some
c > 0 (Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018, Sec. 4.1).4 Their algorithm does not produce an
allocation satisfying further criteria.
Thus, the algorithms in Theorem 1 significantly improve over both Gal et al. (2017) and
Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018)’s algorithms because they apply to a non-linear domain of
preferences and produce allocations in specific selections of the envy-free set. We do pay a
price in the generality of our result compared to Gal et al. (2017), for their algorithm applies
to arbitrary linear transformations of the vector of utilities. For instance, their algorithm
can calculate an allocation that maximizes the summation of utilities for a particular group
of agents among all envy-free allocations. We limit our scope to the narrower set of maxmin
or minmax individual utility or individual rent selections of the envy-free set. Arguably
there is no significant loss of our approach, for we still cover the selections that are actually
used in practice. Furthermore, our restriction is necessary to leverage a topological property
of these selections, rent monotonicity, that was never taken advantage of before from an
algorithmic perspective.5
3A piece-wise linear utility function has the form (ri, a) 7→ vias − λiasri for a collection of consecutive
intervals {Iias}a∈A,s∈Si that covers R. Even though we will state all our results for our domain B, they all
generalize for the piece-wise linear domain when we require for each i, |Si| is polynomial in n and marginal
disutility of paying rent comes from a given fixed set.
4The leading algorithm in Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) solves the case in which slopes are integer
powers of a given (1 + ε). With this they construct an approximate envy-free allocation for an arbitrary
piece-wise linear economy. The approximation is polynomial in 1/ε. Since our objective is to provide
more expressive but simple preferences to the agents, we prefer to present only results for exact envy-free
allocations for finitely many slopes. In this context calculating a maxmin envy-free allocation has a direct
interpretation.
5Rent monotonicity is satisfied only by selections that can be written as maxmin or minmax operators
of utility or rent (Velez, 2017).
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At a high level, we borrow from Gal et al. (2017) the representation of our problems
as linear programs, and from Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) the strategy of first solving
the problem for a rent high enough in which budget constraints are all violated and then
proceeding recursively rebating amounts of rent. Our algorithm significantly differs in that
we are able to maintain control of the location of our iterations with respect to the solution
we want to calculate. Rent monotonicity requires that, as the rent of the house increases,
one recommends allocations in which the rent of each room is higher and the welfare of each
agent is lower (Velez, 2017). Because of this, in the n-dimensional utility and rent spaces
one can see each of these selections as a strictly monotone path that is parameterized by
the aggregate rent to collect. For instance, the utility of an agent and the rent of each room
in each element of R(N,A, u,m) is the same for all the members of this set and are strictly
monotone functions of m (see Velez, 2018). Our approach is to rebate rent and stay on
this path. Due to the piece-wise linearity of our domain, our algorithm may temporarily
deviate from this objective. However, when this happens, we are able to increase the rent
to collect and return to it without losing significant progress towards our goal. Remarkably,
this non-monotone approach does stop in polynomial time.
To provide the reader clarity of the significance of our contribution, we proceed in
three steps. First, we describe the economy of rebates and reshuffles, a formalism that we
introduce and is essential in our construction. Then, we describe how Arunachaleswaran
et al. (2018)’s algorithm works. Finally, we introduce our algorithms and analysis.
3.2 The economy of rebates and reshuffles.
The essential step of the algorithms that we will discuss and construct is the following.
Starting from an envy-free allocation, decrease the rent of each room and reshuffle rooms
so no-envy is preserved. In what follows we introduce notation and provide the intuition
why this is always possible for a small enough rebate, the so called Perturbation Lemma
(Alkan et al., 1991; Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018). This notation and intuition is essential
to later introduce our algorithms for the more general problem.
Suppose that the vector of rents at the starting allocation is r := (ra)a∈A. Since prefer-
ences are in B, for small ε > 0, the difference in utility between bundles (ra, a) and (ra−ε, a)
is a linear function of ε. To preserve correctness of our process, we need to identify the
value of these slopes and account for their eventual changes as one rebates rent.
Definition 1. For each u ∈ BN and r ∈ RA, let
1. SBu(r) := {(i, a) ∈ N ×A : ra > bi};
2.
νia(u, r) :=
{
via + ρibi if (i, a) ∈ SB
u(r),
via otw;
and
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λia(u, r) :=
{
1 + ρi if (i, a) ∈ SB
u(r),
1 otw.
Note that for each i ∈ N and a ∈ A, νia(u, r) and λia(u, r) are such that for some ε > 0
and each rδa ∈ [ra, ra − ε], ui(r
δ
a, a) = νia(u, r)− λia(u, r)r
δ
a.
Consider now a starting envy-free allocation (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). A rebate of rent is
a vector x ∈ RA++ and a reshuffle is a bijection µ : N → A. At rebate and reshuffle (x, µ)
at r, agent i receives bundle (rµ(i)−xµ(i), µ(i)). Utility function u induces a utility function
on rebates and reshuffles at r, given by (xa, a) 7→ ui(ra − xa, a).
Now, suppose that agent i is indifferent between bundles (ra, a) and (rb, b). Then her
preferences between rebates with these rooms are linear for a neighborhood of zero. That
is, for each small enough rebate x, (ra − xa, a) is at least as good as (rb − xb, b) if and only
if λia(u, r)xa ≥ λib(u, r)xb. Note that each agent is indifferent among the best bundles in
{(ra, a) : a ∈ A} and this set includes her assignment at (r, σ). Each agent may not be
indifferent among all bundles in (r, σ). Thus the economy of rebates and reshuffles may not
be linear. However, if we assign linear utilities to bundles with rooms that are not in the
best bundles at (r, µ), the economy becomes linear. As we will see, this greatly helps in our
endeavor if we carefully choose the linearization and aim to rebate only a small amount of
money.
Definition 2. Let u ∈ BN , r ∈ RA for which there is (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), and Λ > 0.
1. For each i ∈ N and a ∈ A, let λia(u, r,Λ) := λia(u, r) if ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(ra, a), and
λia(u, r,Λ) := Λ otherwise.
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2. The Λ-modified rebates and reshuffles economy for u at r is an economy in which
consumption space is R++ × A, and preferences are represented by: for each i ∈ N
and xa > 0, (xa, a) 7→ λia(u, r,Λ)xa.
Let u ∈ BN and (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). A Λ-modified rebates and reshuffles economy
for u at r is isomorphic to a quasi-linear rent allocation economy in which preferences are
strictly increasing in money, i.e., an economy in which the alternatives space is R × A
and agents have preferences (ya, a) 7→ uˆ(ya, a) := log λia(u, r,Λ) + ya. Thus, we can use
all the power of the results for the quasi-linear domain in this economy. In particular,
let µ be an assignment that maximizes
∑
i∈N log λiµ(i)(u, r,Λ) and let ε ∈ R. There is
(y, µ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ, ε) (Alkan et al., 1991). Since the economy is quasi-linear, for each
η ∈ R, ((ya+ η)a∈A, µ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ, ε+nη). Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, for
each δ > 0 we can construct an allocation in the linearized rebates and reshuffles economy
(y, µ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A ya) such that
∑
a∈A exp(ya) = δ.
6Note that λia(u, r,Λ) is well defined, i.e., it is invariant for the choice of σ as long as (r, σ) ∈
F (N,A, u,m).
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Our aim is to guarantee that (r − exp(y), µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − δ). Clearly, this is so
if we guarantee two conditions: (i) µ assigns each agent one object in the best bundles
at (r, σ); and (ii) δ is small enough so for each i ∈ N , if ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a), then
ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra − δ, a).
Continuity of preferences guarantees that δ can be chosen so (ii) holds. The following
lemma states that Λ can be chosen small enough so (i) holds.
Lemma 1. Let u ∈ BN and r ∈ RA for which there is (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). There is
Λ > 0, such that for each 0 < Λ′ ≤ Λ, if µ is a solution to
max
γ:N→A, γ a bijection
∑
i∈N
log(λiγ(i)(u, r,Λ
′)),
then for each i ∈ N and each σ for which (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), ui(rµ(i), µ(i)) = ui(rσ(i), σ(i)).
Proofs omitted in the body of the paper are presented in the Appendix.
The following graphs allow us to summarize the discussion above in one lemma.7
Definition 3 (Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018). For u ∈ BN and r ∈ RA for which there
is (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), let F(r) := (N,A,E) be the bipartite graph were (i, a) ∈ E if
ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(ra, a); and F
u(r) the weighted version of F(r) were for each (i, a) ∈ E,
w(i, a) := log λia(u, r).
Lemma 2 (Perturbation Lemma; Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018). Let (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m).
Suppose that u is piece-wise linear and µ is a maximum weight perfect matching in Fu(r).
Then, there is ε > 0 such that for each δ ∈ [0, ε], there is (rδ, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − δ) such
that for each a ∈ A, rδa < ra.
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3.3 Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018)’s algorithm.
Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) leverage Lemma 2 to construct a polynomial algorithm to
find an envy-free allocation in a piece-wise linear economy in which the slopes in the different
intervals comes from a finite set say of cardinality k. The essential step in this task is the
following. Given η > 0, starting from an envy-free allocation (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m) with u ∈
BN , rebate η > 0 so no-envy and budget violations are preserved. For arbitrary continuous
preferences, Lemma 2 itself does not solve this problem, i.e., stacking the εs produced by
the lemma, may not allow one to reach a rebate of η (Alkan, 1989). Arunachaleswaran et al.
(2018)’s breakthrough is to realize that, in the piecewise linear domain, this can be done
7Lemma 2 is a generalization of the Perturbation Lemma in Alkan et al. (1991) that determines the
existence, but does not identify an assignment with which the rebate and reshuffle can proceed.
8The discussion before the statement of the lemma is almost a detailed proof of it. More formally,
Lemma 3, which we prove in detail in the Appendix, implies Lemma 2.
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by concatenating the solution of the following linear program for a maximal weight perfect
matching in Fu(r), µ:
maxt∈RA
∑
a∈A ta
s.t. : ta ≤ ra ∀a ∈ A
νiµ(i)(u, r)− λiµ(i)(u, r)tµ(i) ≥ νiµ(j)(u, r)− λiµ(j)(u, r)tµ(j) ∀{i, j} ⊆ N
ta ≤ bi ∀(i, a) ∈ SB
u(t)∑
a∈A ta ≥
∑
a∈A ra − η.
(1)
This problem is feasible because r is in the option set. Thus, let (t, σ) be the allocation asso-
ciated with its solution. Since t satisfies the second set of constraints in (1), the allocation is
in F (N,A, u,m− ε) for some 0 < ε ≤ η. Thus, one of the following is true: (i) the solution
is in F (N,A, u,m − η); (ii) the solution hit one of the budget constraints; or (iii) σ is not
a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(t). (If these three conditions simultaneously fail,
by Lemma 2, t would not be a solution to the problem.) If one repeats this starting from
the previously computed allocation, eventually case (i) or (ii) happen in O(nk−1), because
since there are k values for the slopes of the intervals, the maximum number of values for a
maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(s) for any s ∈ RA is bounded above by (n+1)k−1.
Thus, for k constant, one can construct a polynomial algorithm that stops in O(nk+cς),
where ς is the number of intervals in the piece-wise linear representation of preferences. In
our case, with preferences in B, ς is bounded above by 2n2. Thus, the algorithm runs in
O(nk+c).
3.4 Directed search within the envy-free set.
A solution to (1) leads us to a “random” envy-free allocation. We would like to optimize
some further criteria within the envy-free set. The following algorithms achieve this. They
calculate in polynomial time an allocation in R(N,A, u,m) for u ∈ BN .
Algorithm 1 initializes our search by looking for an allocation for a rent M that is high
enough so we make sure that all budget constraints will be violated for each agent, for
each consumption of the agent or the other agents, at each possible envy-free allocation
for (N,A, u,M). For such a high rent preferences are quasi-linear in the range of the
consumption space that contains all envy-free allocations for (N,A, u,M). Thus, one can
find a maxmin allocation by essentially using Gal et al. (2017)’s algorithm for this quasi-
linear preference (lines 3-4).
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 stops in polynomial time. Given input (N,A, u,m) where u ∈ B,
the algorithm returns M and (r, σ) such that M ≥ m and (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,M).
Proof. Lines 1 and 2 are direct definitions. Line 3 is well known to be polynomial in n. For
line 4 we should note that it is indeed a linear program, because all u˜s are linear in r (at this
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ALGORITHM 1: Initializes search of maxmin utility envy-free allocation
Input : (N,A, u,m) were u ∈ BN is associated with (via)i∈N,a∈A, (bi)i∈N , and for each i ∈ N ,
ρi ∈ {ρ1, ..., ρk};
Output: M ≥ m and an allocation in R(N,A, u,M);
1 For each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A, let Via := (via + ρibi)/(1 + ρi) and u˜i the function
(xa, a) 7→ u˜i(xa, a) := (1 + ρi)(Via − xa);
2 Let m′ := n
(
maxi∈N,{a,b∈}⊆A Vib − Via +maxj∈N bj
)
;
3 Let σ be an assignment that maximizes
∑
i∈N Viσ(i);
4 Solve
maxR,r∈RA R
s.t. : R ≤ u˜i(rσ(i), σ(i)) ∀i ∈ N
Viσ(i) − rσ(i) ≥ Viσ(j) − rσ(j) ∀{i, j} ⊆ N∑
a∈A ra = max{m,m
′}
and let r ∈ RA be a solution to this LP;
5 Returns M :=
∑
a∈A ra and (r, σ);
point σ is fixed). It is feasible because given a quasi-linear economy and an assignment σ that
maximizes the summation of values, there is always an envy-free allocation for that economy
with that assignment (Alkan et al., 1991). Because of the second and third sets of constraints
in the program, the feasible set is compact. Thus, the program has a solution. Since the
number of constraints in the program is polynomial in n, the complexity of solving this
problem is known to be polynomial in n. Let M and (r, σ) be the output of the algorithm.
Clearly, M ≥ m. We claim that (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,M). Since for each i ∈ N , (1 + ρi) > 0,
profile u˜ is ordinally equivalent to the quasi-linear profile with values V . Thus, the solution
of the linear program in line 4 solves maxr∈RA:(r,σ)∈F (N,A,u˜,M)minl∈L u˜i(rσ(i), σ(i)).
Let (t, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u˜,M). Since u˜ is ordinally equivalent to a quasi-linear preference
and
{(r, σ), (t, µ)} ⊆ F (N,A, u˜,M), (t, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u˜,M) (Svensson, 2009). Moreover, by
Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991), for each i ∈ N , u˜i(tµ(i), µ(i)) = u˜i(tσ(i), σ(i)). Thus,
minl∈L u˜i(tσ(i), σ(i)) = minl∈L u˜i(tµ(i), µ(i)). Since minl∈L u˜i(rσ(i), σ(i)) ≥ minl∈L u˜i(tσ(i), σ(i)),
then (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u˜,M).
We claim that F (N,A, u˜,M) = F (N,A, u,M) and for each (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,M),
u(tµ(i), µ(i)) = u˜(tµ(i), µ(i)). Let t ∈ R
A be such that,
∑
a∈A ta = M and µ : N → A
a bijection. Then, there is i ∈ N such that ti ≥
(
maxi∈N,{a,b∈}⊆A Vib − Via +maxj∈N bj
)
.
Then, ti ≥ bi. Thus, ui(ti, µ(i)) = u˜i(ti, µ(i)) = (1+ρi)(Viµ(i)−ti). Now, Viµ(i)−ti ≤ Viµ(i)−
maxi∈N,{a,b∈}⊆A Vib − Via −maxj∈N bj. Thus, for each a ∈ A, Viµ(i) − ti ≤ Viµ(i) − (Viµ(i) −
Via) − maxj∈N bj = Via − maxj∈N bj . Thus, for each a ∈ A, ui(ti, µ(i)) = u˜i(ti, µ(i)) ≤
ui(maxj∈N bj, a) = u˜i(maxj∈N bj , a). Suppose that (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u˜,M). Thus, for each
a ∈ A, ta ≥ maxj∈N bj, for otherwise u˜i will envy the agent who receives a at (t, µ). Thus,
for each pair {i, j} ⊆ N , ui(tµ(j), µ(j)) = u˜i(tµ(j), µ(j)). Since (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u˜,M), for
each pair {i, j} ⊆ N , ui(tµ(i), µ(i)) ≥ ui(tµ(j), µ(j)). Thus, (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,M). Suppose
10
then that (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,M). A symmetric argument shows that (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u˜,M).
Since F (N,A, u˜,M) = F (N,A, u,M); for each (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,M) and each i ∈ N ,
u(tµ(i), µ(i)) = u˜(tµ(i), µ(i)), and (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u˜,M), we have that (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,M).
It is worth noting that there is a subtle choice in the construction of Algorithm 1. We
first identify a rent that is high enough to guarantee all budget constraints are violated in
our original economy for each envy-free allocation. Then, we construct a maxmin utility
allocation for this particular rent. One may be tempted to simply consider the quasi-
linear economy that coincides with our economy when budgets are violated, construct a
maxmin allocation for this economy for an arbitrary rent, and then “slide” it so all budgets
are violated. This approach does not work because we need a maxmin allocation with
respect to a linear transformation of these quasi-linear utilities. These selections may not
be invariant to uniform translations of money.
If Algorithm 1 returnsM = m, we have actually computed an element of R(N,A, u,m).
Thus, we need to continue our search only when this algorithm returnsM > m and (r, σ) ∈
R(N,A, u,M). Algorithm 2 does so. This algorithm shares some of its philosophy with
Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018)’s. At a given state in which an allocation in R(N,A, u,m′)
with m′ > m has been calculated, it reshuffles rooms and rebates rent by solving (2), an LP
that maximizes the minimum value of the uis constrained by no-envy and budget regime
changes.
As in Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018)’s algorithm, solving (2) gets us closer to col-
lecting exacly rent m. The solution to this problem, ts, may be such that (ts, σs) 6∈
R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a), however. The issue is that (2) has constraints additional to the envy-
free ones. In particular, the SB constraints of this problem may bind at its solution.9 Thus,
since our objective is a maxmin utility envy-free allocation, this step may lose the maxmin
property. When this is so, i.e., line 10 is reached, we need to correct the situation. We do
so by grabbing the value of (2), Rs, and increasing rents again constrained by no-envy and
maxmin utility Rs, i.e., by solving (3). It turns out that the solution to (3) fits the bill.
First, it is a maxmin utility envy-free allocation with value Rs. This is quite unexpected.
At face value, problem (3) returns a maxmin utility allocation constrained to assignment
σs. This may, in principle, not be an unconstrained maxmin utility allocation. However, it
turns out that, and here is where the subtlety of our analysis resides, when the algorithm
overshoots rebating money with assignment σs, it also reveals that σs admits a maxmin
utility allocation for the highest rent possible before the algorithm “fell” from the maxmin
utility path. Second, compared with ts, the solution to (3) does not decrease any of the
fundamental measures of progress in our algorithm. That is, at a solution of (3), rs, either
σs is not a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(rs) or a new budget constraint was
9The rebate constraints, i.e., tsa ≤ r
s−1
a s, never bind at a solution to (2).
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released.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 2 stops in polynomial time. Given input (N,A, u,m) where u ∈ B,
its output belongs to R(N,A, u,m).
ALGORITHM 2: Calculates a maxmin envy-free allocation.
Input : (N,A, u,m), u ∈ BN , b := (bi)i∈N , ρ := (ρi)i∈N ∈ {ρ1, ..., ρk}N , M > m, and
(r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,M)
Output: an allocation in R(N,A, u,m)
1 Initialize s← 0;
2 Let (rs, σs) := (r, σ) and Rs := mini∈N ui(rσ(i), σ(i));
3 while
∑
a∈A r
s
a > m do
4 Update s← s+ 1;
5 For each i ∈ N and a ∈ A, let u˜si (ta, a) := ν
s
ia(u, r)− λ
s
ia(u, r)ta;
6 Let σs be a maximum weight perfect matching in Fu(rs−1);
7 Solve
maxR,ts∈RA R
s.t. : tsa ≤ r
s−1
a ∀a ∈ A
R ≤ u˜si (t
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) ∀i ∈ N
u˜si (t
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) ≥ u˜si (t
s
σs(j), σ
s(j)) ∀{i, j} ⊆ N
tsa ≥ bi ∀(i, a) ∈ SB
u(rs−1)∑
a∈A t
s
a ≥ m
(2)
and let ts ∈ RA and Rs be a solution to this LP;
8 if (ts, σs) ∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a) then
9 rs ← ts
10 else
11 Solve
maxrs∈RA
∑
a∈A r
s
a
s.t. : rsa ≥ t
s
a ∀a ∈ A
Rs ≤ u˜si (r
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) ∀i ∈ N
u˜si (r
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) ≥ u˜si (r
s
σs(j), σ
s(j)) ∀{i, j} ⊆ N
(3)
and let rs be a solution to this LP;
12 end
13 end
14 Return (rs, σs);
The first step in the proof of the theorem is to realize that the Perturbation Lemma can
be strengthened to guarantee that perturbations can preserve the maxmin utility property.
Lemma 3 (Maxmin perturbation Lemma). Let (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m) such that u ∈ BN
and µ a maximum weight perfect matching in Fu(r). Then, there is ε > 0 and a function
δ ∈ [0, ε] 7→ (rδ, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − δ) such that (r0, µ) = (r, µ); and for each pair
0 ≤ δ < η ≤ ε, and each i ∈ N , ui(r
η
µ(i), µ(i)) > ui(r
δ
µ(i), µ(i)), and for each a ∈ A, r
δ
a > r
η
a.
12
Lemma 3 guarantees that the solution to (2) will decrease the aggregate rent we are
collecting. Now, suppose that we are at some iteration of Algorithm 2 for s > 0 in which
we find that (ts, σs) 6∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a). Intuitively, the algorithm deviated from the
monotone path (in utility space and rent space) that is determined by the maxmin utility
envy-free solution. We argue now that by solving (3) we are able to return to this path
without significant loss of progress. More precisely, our solution to (3), i.e., (rs, σs) is in
R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s
a) and R
s is the minimum utility at (rs, σs).
Suppose then that Rs, the value of problem (2), is the minimum utility at (ts, σs), an
allocation that is not in the maxmin path. Let R∗ be the maximal minimum utility across
agents, bounded above by Rs, at an envy-free allocation obtained by a rebate at (rs−1, σs−1),
for assignment σs. If we want to keep our solution in the maxmin path, our best chance with
assignment σs is to return to an allocation with maxmin value R∗. Obviously, R∗ ≤ Rs.
It turns out that R∗ = Rs. Let (r∗, σs) be an allocation associated with R∗ (in the set
that defines R∗). If R∗ < Rs, one can show that (rs, σs) is obtained by rebating money in
each room at (r∗, σs). Intuitively, this reveals that there was still room to rebate money at
(r∗, σs) without changing the assignment. The following key lemma states that this implies
that σs must be a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(r∗).
Lemma 4 (Converse perturbation lemma). Let u ∈ BN , ε > 0, (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m) and
(t, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m− ε) such that for each a ∈ A, ra > ta. Suppose that there is no i ∈ N
and a ∈ A such that, ra > bi > ta. Then, σ is a maximal weight perfect matching in F
u(r).
Thus, it is impossible that R∗ < Rs, for otherwise by Lemma 3, R∗ would not be
maximal. Consequently, in order to recover a maxmin allocation with value Rs, we can
keep assignment σs and increase rent from ts, i.e., we can solve (3). Again by Lemma 3,
either a budget constraint was just released at (rs, σs), or σs is not a maximal weight perfect
matching in Fu(rs). Thus, if by the time all budget constraints are released, which must
happen in polynomial time, the algorithm has not stopped, it will do so after solving (2)
only once more.
Proof of Theorem 3. We prove that the processes in each line of the algorithm are well
defined and can be individually completed in polynomial time. Then we bound the number
of times the while loop is visited.
For each s ≥ 1, (rs−1, σs) ∈ F (N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s−1
a ), because it is either the input when
s = 0 or the solution to either (2) or (3), which have no-envy constraints. As long as
(rs−1, σs) ∈ F (N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s−1
a ), r
s−1 is in the feasible set of (2). Because of the first
and last constraints, this set is compact. Thus, it has a solution. Since it is a linear program
with a polynomial number of constraints, it can be computed in polynomial time.
Line 8 can be completed in polynomial time, i.e., given ts ∈ RA and σs : N → A a bi-
jection, (t, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A ta) is verifiable in polynomial time. By Velez (Proposition
13
5.9 2018), this problem is equivalent to check that the allocation is envy-free and that for a
given directed graph with n nodes, there is a path from each node to a given set of nodes.
Because of the first and second constraint in (3), the feasible set in this program is
compact.10 Since ts belongs to this feasible set, the program has a solution.
We claim that the algorithm stops. Moreover, if it returns (rs, σs), s is bounded by
nk+2. Thus, the algorithm runs in O(nk+c) for some c > 2.
Suppose that we update s in line 4,
∑
a∈A r
s−1
a > m, (r
s−1, σs−1) ∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s−1
a ),
and Rs−1 = mini∈N ui(rσs−1(i), σ
s−1(i)). Let ts be the solution to (2). Then, (ts, σs) ∈
F (N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a). Thus, σ
s is a perfect matching in Fu(ts). If
∑
a∈A t
s
a = m, the algo-
rithm terminates. Suppose then that
∑
a∈A t
s
a > m. We claim that (r
s, σs) ∈ R
(
N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s
a
)
,
Rs = mini∈N ui(r
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)), and rs is a solution to (2). This is obviously so when
(ts, σs) ∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a) and thus r
s = ts.
Suppose then that (ts, σs) 6∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a). Thus, r
s is a solution to (3). Let R∗
be the maximum of{
R ≤ Rs : ∃(t, σs) ∈ R
(
N,A, u,
∑
a∈A
ta
)
, R = min
i∈N
ui(tσs(i), σ
s(i))
}
. (4)
By Lemma 3, the set above is non-empty. Since preferences are continuous, the set is
also closed (this follows from Velez (Proposition 2-2, 2017) and Alkan et al. (Decomposition
Lemma, 1991)). Thus, R∗ is well-defined andR∗ > Rs−1. Let (r∗, σs) ∈ R
(
N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
∗
a
)
be such that
R∗ = mini∈N ui(r
∗
σs(i), σ
s(i)). We claim that R∗ = Rs. Suppose by contradiction that
R∗ < Rs. Since R∗ > Rs−1, by Velez (Theorem 1, 2017) and Alkan et al. (Decomposition
Lemma, 1991), for each a ∈ A, rs−1a > r
∗
a. By Velez (Proposition 5.9 and Lemma 5.7,
2018), for each a ∈ A, r∗a > r
s
a. Because of the first constraints in (2), this program rebates
money from (rs−1, σs−1). Since the program is also constrained by budget regime changes,
i.e., the SB constraints, Bu(r∗) = Bu(rs). Thus, by Lemma 4, σs is a maximal weight
perfect matching in Fu(r∗). By Lemma 3, R∗ is not the maximal element of (4). This is a
contradiction.
SinceR∗ = Rs, we have that (r∗, σs) ∈ R
(
N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
∗
a
)
andRs = mini∈N ui(r
∗
σs(i), σ
s(i)).
Since for each i ∈ N , ui(t
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) ≥ Rs, by Velez (Proposition 5.9 and Lemma 5.7, 2018),
for each a ∈ A, tsa ≥ r
∗
a. Thus, r
∗ is in the feasible set of (3). Since rs is a solution of (3),
it is also in its feasible set. Thus, for each i ∈ N , Rs ≤ mini∈N ui(r
∗
σs(i), σ
s(i)). By Velez
(Proposition 5.9 and Lemma 5.7, 2018), for each a ∈ A, rsa ≥ r
∗
a. Since r
s is a solution
of (3), r∗ = rs. Thus, (rs, σs) ∈ R
(
N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s
a
)
and Rs = mini∈N ui(r
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)).
Thus, rs is also a solution to (2).
We claim that it must be the case that either there is (i, a) ∈ SBu(rs−1) such that
10Even if utility was not linear, this program is compact because Rs is the value of (2).
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rsa = bi, or σ
s is not a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(rs). Suppose by contradiction
that for each (i, a) ∈ SBu(rs−1), rsa > bi, and σ
s is a maximal weight perfect matching in
Fu(rs). By Lemma 3, there is δ > 0 and tδ ∈ RA such that (tδ, σs) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − δ);
for each a ∈ A, tδa < r
s
a ≤ r
s−1
a ; for each (i, a) ∈ SB
u(rs−1), tδa > bi; and
∑
a∈A t
δ
a > m; and
for each i ∈ N , ui(t
δ
σs(i), σ
s(i)) > ui(r
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)). Since for each (i, a) ∈ Bu(rs−1), tδa > bi,
then for each i ∈ N , u˜i(t
δ
σs(i), σ
s(i)) > u˜i(r
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)). Thus, mini∈N u˜
s
i (r
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) <
mini∈N u˜
s
i (t
δ
σs(i), σ
s(i)). Thus, rs is not a solution to (2). This is a contradiction.
Thus, each time that s is updated, either |SBu(rs)| < |SBu(rs−1)| or the weight of σs
in Fu(rs−1) is greater than the weight of σs−1 in Fu(rs−2). There are at most n2 elements
in SBu(r0) and at most (n + 1)k−1 values for the weight of a perfect matching. Thus, the
algorithm either stops or reaches a state in which SBu(rs) = ∅ in O(nk+c) for some c > 0.
If SBu(rs) = ∅, the algorithm returns the solution to (2) in the next while loop iteration.
Indeed, without the SB constraints, (2) always returns a maxmin utility allocation. Now,
each optimal assignment in a quasi-linear economy can substitute the assignment in any
envy-free allocation preserving no-envy (Svensson, 2009; Gal et al., 2017) (see (Procaccia
et al., 2018) for a short proof). Since the slopes of u are then invariant under a decrease of
rent, if the while loop were going to be visited for s+ 1, then σs would still be a maximal
perfect matching in Fu(rs), and by Lemma 6, ts would not be a solution to (2).
3.5 Proof of Theorem 1
Algorithms 1 and 2 can be modified to calculate the allocations for all the selections in
Theorem 1. Formally, a selection (from the envy-free set) is a set valued function that
associates with each economy a subset of envy-free allocations for it. The generic selection
is (N,A, u,m) 7→ Ψ(N,A, u,m) ⊆ F (N,A, u,m). A selection Ψ is essentially single-valued
if each agent is indifferent between each pair of allocations in Ψ(N,A, u,m). It is well-
known that if Ψ is essentially single-valued, for a given room, say a ∈ A, the rent assigned
to room a is the same in each allocation in Ψ(N,A, u,m) (Alkan et al., 1991; Velez, 2017).
An essentially single-valued selection Ψ is rent monotone if for each i ∈ N , the function
(N,A, u,m) 7→ ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) for (r, σ) ∈ Ψ(N,A, u,m) is a strictly decreasing function ofm.
It is well-known that an essentially single-valued Ψ is rent monotone if and only if the rent
component functions (N,A, u,m) 7→ ra where (r, σ) ∈ Ψ(N,A, u,m), are strictly increasing
functions of m (Alkan et al., 1991; Velez, 2017). A selection Ψ is Pareto indifferent if
for each (r, σ) ∈ Ψ(N,A, u,m) and each (t, µ) such that for each i ∈ N , ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) =
ui(tµ(i), µ(i)), we have that (t, µ) ∈ Ψ(N,A, u,m). Each selection in the statement of
Theorem 1 is essentially single-valued, rent monotone, and Pareto indifferent (Alkan et al.,
1991; Velez, 2017).
First, consider a non-empty family of positive affine linear transformations (fi)i∈S for
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some S ⊆ N . One can calculate an allocation in
argmax
(r,σ)∈F (e)
min
i∈S
fi(ui(rσ(i), σ(i)))
by trivially modifying these algorithms as follows: In the LP in Algorithm 1 replace the
maxmin constraints R ≤ u˜i(·), ∀i ∈ N with R ≤ fi(u˜
s
i (·)), ∀i ∈ S; in Algorithm 2 replace
R ≤ u˜si (·), ∀i ∈ N with R ≤ fi(u˜
s
i (·)), ∀i ∈ S in (2), and replace R
s ≤ u˜si (·), ∀i ∈ N with
R ≤ fi(u˜
s
i (·)), ∀i ∈ S in (3). The analysis of correctness and complexity of the algorithms
goes through unmodified. In particular, the only lemma that refers to R, Lemma 3, can
be easily generalized to any essentially single-valued, rent monotone, and Pareto indifferent
selection of the envy-free set.
Similarly, for a non-empty family of positive affine linear transformations (ga)a∈C for
some C ⊆ A, one can calculate an element of
argmin
(r,µ)∈F (e)
max
a∈C
ga(ra) (5)
as folllows. Replace the LP in Algorithm 1 with
minR,r∈RA R
s.t. : R ≥ g˜a(ra) ∀a ∈ C
Viσ(i) − rσ(i) ≥ Viσ(j) − rσ(j) ∀{i, j} ⊆ N∑
a∈A ra = max{m,m
′},
(6)
and replace (2) with
minR,ts∈RA R
s.t. : tsa ≤ r
s−1
a ∀a ∈ A
R ≥ ga(ra) ∀a ∈ C
u˜si (t
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) ≥ u˜si (t
s
σs(j), σ
s(j)) ∀{i, j} ⊆ N
tsa ≥ bi ∀(i, a) ∈ SB
u(rs−1)∑
a∈A t
s
a ≥ m
(7)
and (3) with
maxrs∈RA
∑
a∈A r
s
a
s.t. : rsa ≥ t
s
a ∀a ∈ A
Rs ≥ ga(ra) ∀a ∈ C
u˜si (r
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) ≥ u˜si (r
s
σs(j), σ
s(j)) ∀{i, j} ⊆ N
(8)
The above modifications are rather obvious. It is very useful to emphasize why they do
work, however. We will encounter next that the modification of the algorithms for the other
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two families of solutions in the theorem requires some extra thought.
To fix ideas suppose that C = A and the gas are the identity functions. Thus, the
modifications above lead to an allocation in which the maximal rent paid by some agent is
minimized in the envy-free set, the minmax rent envy-free solution. Clearly, (6) produces
a minmax rent envy-free allocation for the quasi-linear preferences that coincide with u in
the range for which all budgets are violated. Thus, it is again a viable seed for Algorithm 2.
Now consider (7). This LP is minimizing the maximal rent with some constraints for the
economies in which rent is at least m. In other words, the problem is trying to rebate
money constrained by the limit to rebate up to the point in which aggregate rent is m.
This is why its solution inches towards our goal. Similarly, LP (8) is trying to increase the
aggregate rent to collect constrained by the maximal rent being Rs. This is why its solution
rights a possible overshoot by (7). The replication of our analysis with R is perfunctory
because (5) defines an essentially single-valued, rent monotone, Pareto indifferent selection
from the envy-free set.
Now consider again a non-trivial family of positive affine linear transformations (fi)i∈S
with S ⊆ N . Our objective is to calculate an element in
argmin
(r,σ)∈F (e)
max
i∈S
fi(ui(rσ(i), σ(i))). (9)
A trivial modification of the LP in Algorithm 1 in which one sets a minimization problem
and replaces the maxmin constraints R ≤ u˜i(·) with the minmax constraints R ≥ fi(u˜
s
i (·))
does produce a minmax envy-free allocation for the range in which budget constraints are
violated. However, one finds a hurdle if one trivially transforms (2) into a minmax LP. The
issue is that this problem is intended to rebate rent. If the objective becomes to minimize
the maximal utility, the modified LP does not try to do this, because the maximal utility
becomes lower as rent increases.
Thus, in order to find an element of (9) we need to rethink the whole structure of our
approach. Instead of initially calculating an allocation for an aggregate rent that is large
enough so the budget constraints are violated and then rebate rent, we need to do the
opposite: Calculate an allocation for low enough rent so no budget constraint is violated
and then increase rent. Modifying and analyzing Algorithm 1 is again perfunctory. Now
that we are recursively increasing rent (last constraint in (2) flips to ≤), a minmax version
of (2) and a min version of (3) work in the right direction. There are still two problems.
First, the lemmas that guide our analysis of Algorithm 2 are not useful anymore, for they
refer to rebates of rent. Second, we need to revise the choice of the assignment for which
these programs must be solved (Line 6 of Algorithm 2). These two issues are related because
our choice of this assignment is suggested by Lemma 3.
Suppose then that starting at some allocation (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,
∑
a∈A ra) we intend
to increase rent. Analogously to the economy of rebates and reshuffles, we can define an
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economy of surcharges and reshuffles as follows.
Given a preferce u ∈ B let κia(u, r) be the absolute value of agent i’s marginal disutility of
an increase of rent on room a at r (this is the equivalent to λia(u, r) for an increase of rent). A
surcharge of rent is a vector x ∈ RA++ and a reshuffle is a bijection µ : N → A. At surcharge
and reshuffle (x, µ) at r, agent i receives bundle (rµ(i)+xµ(i), µ(i)). Utility function u induces
a utility function on surcharges and reshuffles at r, given by (xa, a) 7→ ui(ra + xa, a). Now,
suppose that agent i is indifferent between bundles (ra, a) and (rb, b). Then her preferences
between surcharges with these rooms are negative linear for a neighborhood of zero. That
is, for each rebate x small enough (so budget regimes do not change), (ra+xa, a) is at least
as good as (rb + xb, b) if and only if −κia(u, r)xa ≥ −κib(u, r)xb.
Note that each agent is indifferent among the best bundles in {(ra, a) : a ∈ A} and this
set includes her assignment at (r, σ). Each agent may not be indifferent among all bundles
in (r, σ). Thus the economy of surcharges and reshuffles may not be negative linear. Again,
for K > 0 we can assign utilities −K(·) to the bundles with rooms that are not in the best
bundles at (r, µ), so the economy becomes so. Denote the absolute value of the slopes of
these utilities by κ(u, r,K).
Let u ∈ BN and (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). AK-modified surcharges and reshuffles economy
for u at r is isomorphic to a quasi-linear rent allocation economy in which preferences are
strictly decreasing in money, i.e., an economy in which the alternatives space is R×A and
agents have preferences (ya, a) 7→ uˆ(ya, a) := − log κia(u, r,K) − ya. Thus, again we can
use all the power of the results for the quasi-linear domain in this economy. In particular,
let µ be an assignment that minimizes
∑
i∈N log κiµ(i)(u, r,K) and let ε ∈ R. There is
(y, µ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ, ε) (Alkan et al., 1991). Since the economy is quasi-linear, for each
η ∈ R, ((ya + η)a∈A, µ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ, ε + nη). Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem,
for each δ > 0 we can construct an allocation in the linearized surcharges and reshuffles
economy (y, µ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A ya) such that
∑
a∈A exp(ya) = δ.
Our aim is to guarantee that (r + exp(y), µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m + δ). Clearly, this is so
if we guarantee two conditions: (i) µ assigns each agent one room in the best bundles
at (r, σ); and (ii) δ is small enough so for each i ∈ N , if ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a), then
ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra + δ, a).
Continuity of preferences guarantee that δ can be chosen so (ii) holds. Again K can be
chosen large enough so (i) holds, i.e., a symetric version of Lemma 1 holds. Thus, clearly the
following symmetric version of Lemma 2 holds. We denote by Fuκ (r) the weighted version
of F(r) were for each (i, a) ∈ E, w(i, a) := log κia(u, r).
Lemma 5 (Left perturbation Lemma). Let (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). Suppose that u is piece-
wise linear and µ is a minimum weight perfect matching in Fuκ (r). Then, there is ε > 0
such that for each δ ∈ [0, ε], there is (rδ, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m + δ) such that for each a ∈ A,
rδa > ra.
By working on the surcharges and rebates economy instead of the rebates and reshuffles
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economy one also proves the following symmetric versions of Lemmas 3 and 4. We omit the
proof of these results, which can be completed with symmetric arguments to those in our
proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4.
Lemma 6 (Monotone left perturbation Lemma). Let Ψ be an essentially-single valued,
rent monotone, Pareto indifferent selection from envy-free set. Suppose that u ∈ BN and
(r, σ) ∈ Ψ(N,A, u,m). Let µ be a minimum weight perfect matching in Fuκ (r). Then, there
is ε > 0 such that for each δ ∈ [0, ε] there is (rδ, µ) ∈ Ψ(N,A, u,m + δ).
Lemma 7 (Converse left perturbation lemma). Let u ∈ BN , ε > 0, (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m)
and (t, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − ε) such that for each a ∈ A, ra > ta. Suppose that there is no
i ∈ N and a ∈ A such that, ra > bi > ta. Then, σ is a minimal weight perfect matching in
Fuκ (t).
The modification of Algorithm 2 is completed by selecting in Line 6 a minimal weight
perfect matching in Fu(rs−1). The analysis follows then from similar arguments based on
Lemmas 6 and 7.
Finally, the modification to compute an element of a maxmin rent envy-free allocation
(third family in the theorem) is then perfunctory.
4 Discussion
Incentives. A relevant question is the extent to which the algorithms we construct are
manipulable. The incentives of envy-free rent division algorithms are relatively well under-
stood. First, no such algorithm is dominant strategies incentive compatible. This goes back
to Green and Laffont (1979), for envy-free rent allocations are budget balanced and Pareto
efficient. Strikingly, for each mechanism that admits quasi-linear reports, there is at most
one profile of preferences in which each agent’s true report is a dominant strategy (Velez,
2018). Better news are obtained for complete information non-cooperative incentives. If
preference reports are required to be quasi-linear, the non-cooperative outcomes (limit Nash
equilibrium outcomes) from the complete information manipulation games induced by any
envy-free allocation algorithm are exactly the envy-free allocations for the true preference
profile (Velez, 2015, 2018). If agents are allowed to report arbitrary continuous preferences,
and one had the means to calculate an envy-free allocation for such reports, there may be
inefficient allocations that result as non-cooperative outcomes for this allocation process
(Velez, 2015). This problem arises only when agents can report arbitrarily large marginal
disutility of paying rent, however. If preferences are required to be piece-wise linear budget
constrained with an upper bound on the marginal disutility of paying rent, the incentives
in the quasi-linear domain are preserved. That is, when reports are required to be in B,
the non-cooperative outcomes from the complete information manipulation games induced
19
by any envy-free allocation algorithm are exactly the envy-free allocations for the true
preference profile (Velez, 2019).
Elicitation and calibration. One can construct elicitation schemes for the preference
parameters (via)a∈A, bi and ρi based on a strict interpretation of this domain as representing
the actual preferences of the agents (Velez, 2019). In practice, one may want to deploy a
version of this model in which agents are asked for their financial constraints on a coarse
scale, say low, medium, and high. Since no-envy can be tested ex-post, it is plausible that
one can calibrate values for these reports (based on experimental or field data) to maximize
the performance of these mechanisms. These are open questions that are left for future
research.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let Λ > 0 be such that for each a ∈ A such that
ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a), log Λ + (n− 1)maxi∈N,a∈A λia <
∑
i∈N λiσ(i).
The following lemma plays a key role in the proof of Lemmas 3 and 4.
Lemma 8. Let u ∈ BN , ε > 0, (r, γ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), and (t, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − ε) such
that σ is a perfect matching in F(r) and for each a ∈ A, ra > ta. Suppose that there is no
i ∈ N and a ∈ A such that, ra > bi > ta. Then, there is Λ > 0 satisfying the property of
Lemma 1 for r, such that
(r − t, σ) ∈ F
(
N,A, (λia(u, r,Λ)(·))i∈N,a∈A ,
∑
a∈A
ra − ta
)
.
Proof of Lemma 8. Since σ is a perfect matching in F(r), (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). Let
Λ > 0, i ∈ N , and a ∈ A such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(ra, a). Thus, λia(u, r,Λ) = λia(u, r).
Since (t, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − ε), for each {i, j} ⊆ N , ui(tσ(i), σ(i)) ≥ ui(ta, a). Thus,
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ui(tσ(i), σ(i))− ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) ≥ ui(ta, a)− ui(ra, a). Since there is no i ∈ N and a ∈ A such
that, ra > bi > ta, this inequality can be written as λiσ(i)(u, r)(rσ(i)− tσ(i)) ≥ λia(u, r)(ra−
ta). Thus, λiσ(i)(u, r,Λ)(rσ(i) − tσ(i)) ≥ λia(u, r,Λ)(ra − ta). Now, for each i ∈ N and
a ∈ A such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a), λia(u, r,Λ) = Λ. Thus, for such i and a,
λiσ(i)(u, r,Λ)(rσ(i) − tσ(i)) ≥ λia(u, r,Λ)(ra − ta) if and only if λiσ(i)(u, r)(rσ(i) − tσ(i)) ≥
Λ(ra − ta). Since for each i ∈ N , λiσ(i)(u, r) > 0 and for each b ∈ A, λiσ(i)(u, r) > 0 and
rb− tb > 0, one can select Λ > 0 satisfying the property of Lemma 1 and for which all these
inequalities are also satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider a rebate and reshuffle at (r, σ), i.e., a vector x := (xa)a∈A ∈
R
A
++ and an assignment µ : N → A that induce allocation (r − x, µ). Fix Λ satisfying the
property in Lemma 1 for r. For each i ∈ N , let uˆi be the function (ya, a) ∈ R × A 7→
uˆi(ya, a) := log λia(u, r,Λ) + ya.
Let ε > 0 be such that (i) for each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) >
ui(ra, a), we have that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra − 2ε, a); and (ii) for each (i, a) ∈ SB
u(r),
ra − ε > bi. This ε is well defined because preferences u are continuous.
Fix δ ∈ (0, ε].
Step 1 : Let (yδ, γ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A y
δ
a) be such that
∑
a∈A exp(y
δ
a) = δ. Let r
δ :=
(ra − exp(y
δ
a))a∈A. We claim that (r
δ, γ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − δ).
For simplicity, for each i ∈ N , let λia := λia(u, r) and λˆia := λia(u, r,Λ). Since∑
a∈A exp(y
δ
a) = δ, and
∑
a∈A ra = m, then
∑
a∈A r
δ
a = m− δ. Since
∑
a∈A exp(y
δ
a) = δ, for
each a ∈ A, exp(yδa) < δ ≤ ε. Since uˆ is quasi-linear and γ admits an envy-free allocation
for an economy with preferences uˆ, γ maximizes the summation of values for uˆ (Svensson,
1983). By Lemma 1, γ is a perfect matching in F(r). Thus, ui(rγ(i), γ(i)) = ui(rσ(i), σ(i)).
Thus, for each a ∈ A such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a), we have that ui(rγ(i), γ(i)) =
ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra−ε, a) ≥ ui(ra−δ, a). Thus, ui(rγ(i)−exp(y
δ
γ(i)), γ(i)) > ui(ra−δ, a) >
ui(ra − y
δ
a, a). Let A ∈ A be such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(ra, a). Since both (rγ(i), γ(i))
and (ra, a) maximize ui among the bundles in (r, σ), we have that λˆiγ(i) = λiγ(i) and
λˆia = λia. Since ui(rγ(i), γ(i)) = ui(ra, a), ui(rγ(i) − y
δ
γ(i), γ(i)) ≥ ui(ra − y
δ
a, a) if and
only if λˆiγ(i) exp(y
δ
γ(i)) ≥ λˆia exp(y
δ
a). This happens if and only if log λˆiγ(i) + y
δ
γ(i) ≥
log λˆia+ y
δ
a. Now, log λˆiγ(i) + y
δ
γ(i) ≥ log λˆia+ y
δ
a holds because (y
δ, γ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈ya
).
Thus, ui(rγ(i) − exp(y
δ
γ(i)), γ(i)) ≥ ui(ra − exp(y
δ
a), a). Thus, for each pair {i, j} ⊆ N ,
ui(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)) ≥ ui(r
δ
γ(j), γ(j)). Thus, (r
δ, γ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − δ).
Step 2 : Let (rδ, γ) be a solution to
max
(rδ ,γ)∈F (N,A,u,m−δ)
min
i∈N
ui(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)). (10)
We claim that for each maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(r), (rδ, µ) is a solution
to (10). Since (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m), for each a ∈ A, rδa < ra (Alkan et al., 1991; Velez,
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2017). Thus, for each a ∈ A, ra − r
δ
1 < δ ≤ ε. By our choice of ε, there is no i ∈ N and
a ∈ A such that, ra > bi > r
δ
a. We prove that γ is a perfect matching in F(r) = (N,A,E).
Suppose by contradiction that there is i ∈ N and a ∈ A, such that (i, a) 6∈ E. Then,
ui(rγ(i), γ(i)) 6= ui(rσ(i), σ(i)). Since (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), ui(rγ(i), γ(i)) < ui(rσ(i), σ(i)).
By our choice of ε, ui(r
δ
σ(i), σ(i)) > ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(rγ(i)−2ε, γ(i)) ≥ ui(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)). Since
γ(i) 6= σ(i), (rδ, γ) 6∈ F (N,A, u,m − δ). This contradicts (rδ, γ) is a solution to (10). By
Lemma 8, we can further select Λ > 0 satisfying the property of Lemma 1 for r and such
that
(r − rδ, γ) ∈ F
(
N,A, (λia(u, r,Λ)(·))i∈N,a∈A ,
∑
a∈A
ra − r
δ
a
)
.
Thus,
(log(ra − r
δ
a)a∈A, γ) ∈ F
(
N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A
log(ra − r
δ
a)
)
,
and for each µ′ that is a solution to
max
γ′:N→A, γ′ a bijection
∑
i∈N
log(λiγ′(i)(u, r,Λ)), (11)
we have that µ′ is a perfect matching in F(r) (this is the property of Lemma 1 for r).
Since µ is a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(r), µ is also a solution to (11). Since
each optimal assignment in a quasi-linear economy can substitute the assignment in any
envy-free allocation preserving no-envy (Svensson, 2009; Gal et al., 2017) (see (Procaccia
et al., 2018) for a short proof),
(log(ra − r
δ
a)a∈A, µ) ∈ F
(
N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A
log(ra − r
δ
a)
)
.
Since
∑
a∈A exp(log(ra − r
δ
a)) = δ, by Step 1, (r
δ, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − δ). By Alkan et al.
(Lemma 3, 1991), for each i ∈ N , ui(r
δ
µ(i), µ(i)) = ui(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)). Thus, mini∈N ui(r
δ
µ(i), µ(i)) =
minl∈L u(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)). Thus, (r
δ, µ) is a solution to (10).
Step 3 : Concludes. Let µ be a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(r). Consider
the function δ ∈ [0, ε] 7→ (rδ, µ) where (r0, µ) = (r, µ) and for each δ ∈ (0, ε], (rδ, µ) is a
solution to (10). Since µ is a perfect matching in F(r), (r, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). By Alkan
et al. (Lemma 3, 1991), for each i ∈ N , ui(rµ(i), µ(i)) = ui(rσ(i), σ(i)). Since (r, σ) ∈
R(N,A, u,m), we have that (r, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m). Thus, for each δ ∈ [0, ε], (rδ, µ) ∈
R(N,A, u,m − δ). Thus, for each pair 0 < δ < η < ε, and each i ∈ N , ui(r
η
µ(i), µ(i)) >
ui(r
δ
µ(i), µ(i)), and for each a ∈ A, r
δ
a > r
η
a (Alkan et al., 1991; Velez, 2017).
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider a rebate and reshuffle at (r, σ), i.e., a vector x := (xa)a∈A ∈
R
A
++ and an assignment µ : N → A that induce allocation (r − x, µ). Fix Λ satisfying the
property in Lemma 1 for r. For each i ∈ N , let uˆi be the function (ya, a) ∈ R × A 7→
uˆi(ya, a) := log λia(u, r,Λ) + ya. Since (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), σ is a perfect matching in
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F(r). By Lemma 8 one can select Λ such that (log(r−t), σ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A log(ra−ta)).
Since uˆ is quasi-linear, σ maximizes the summation of the values for uˆ (Svensson, 1983).
Thus, σ is a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(r).
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